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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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British Labor's New Role

by William H. Stringer

WASHINGTON—The British Labor party, united as it has not been since the postwar years of the Attlee-Cripps government—and with Aneurin Bevan donning the toga of mid-road statesmanship—is harrying the Tory regime of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and talking headily of victory in the next general election.

The fact that the Conservative party has suffered a string of successive by-election defeats for the past 20 months has convinced Labor's leaders that they could win control of Parliament handily if the ballots were to be cast tomorrow. But with Prime Minister Macmillan holding his House of Commons ranks unshaken, and with a pugnacious new party chairman, Viscount Hailsham, appointed to boost party organization and flagging spirits, there is little likelihood of a new general election inside of two years. The Conservatives, who hold a Commons majority of nearly 60, have until 1960 to resuscitate their fortunes.

Recent changes in political outlook and atmosphere in Britain are not only causing Labor to scent victory but are encouraging the Liberal party, which now has a scant five seats in Parliament, to hope for a startling

comeback. The sharp upswing in the cost of living has pressed hard on Britain's middle class and has detached the "floating vote," which so often swings British elections, from its Conservative moorings. Analysis of recent by-elections, together with public opinion polls, shows that this vote has not—so far—switched appreciably to Labor. Some disgruntled folk have simply stayed home; others have voted Liberal in the by-elections. The swing away from the Conservative standard since June 1956 is estimated at between 6 and 7 percent.

Liberals have actually talked of putting up 200 candidates in the next election. There is little present likelihood that they would win many parliamentary contests, even with the special appeal they are making to youth; but Liberal inroads on the Conservative vote, as now calculated, could cause the Tories to lose as many as 35 seats.

However, Laborite strategists, including Mr. Bevan, who would be foreign secretary if his party came to power, see in these shifting allegiances an opportunity to triumph if Labor can appear as the "party of the future" without espousing policies so socialist and

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doctrinaire as to alienate the traditionalist instincts of the middle class or the sizable segment of working-class people who have been recently voting Tory.

Hence it is not surprising to see "Nye" Bevan, once dubbed the "terror of Tonypany"—whose youthful upbringing in the harsh conditions of Welsh coal valleys had caused him to express vehement anti-Toryism—now being called the "tamed lion of British Labor." Bevan has moderated his stand against H-bomb tests and joined with Labor chieftain Hugh Gaitskell in tempering his party's advocacy of nationalization of industry into a mild proposal for industrial shareholding.

The Labor party has recently changed in outlook and appearance, with more "bright young men" from the universities joining the ranks and less display of its ancient crusading militancy. Moving with the times, "Nye" Bevan, who earned Conservative praise for his moderate position during the Suez crisis, recently made a lecture tour in the United States to update his impressions of a country whose policies he has frequently criticized but which he had not visited since 1934.

During this tour Americans have seen a mellowed Welshman, who professes that he found Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to be wholly agreeable and likable when he met him at a British Embassy dinner in Washington, and who expresses admiration for the amount of "new furniture"—meaning roads, housing, factories, city development—which

the United States has accumulated since 1934.

What Would Be Bevan's Policy?

It is evident from his current comments, however, that Mr. Bevan as foreign secretary would display a more independent foreign policy toward the United States than is currently practiced in Whitehall, although he regards the unwritten Anglo-American alliance as fundamental to allied diplomacy. Britain's major diplomatic task, as Mr. Bevan sees it, should be to prevent a perilous polarization of the world around the United States and the Soviet Union. Britain should not essay a "third force" role but should seek a negotiated withdrawal of the two great-power blocs from direct contact with each other, and try gradually to ease East-West tensions through mutual concessions.

Bevan holds that Britain ought not to halt unilaterally its testing and perfecting of hydrogen bombs. Rather, Britain must retain these bombs as a bargaining counter while seeking a negotiated suspension of all H-bomb tests and the world-wide banning of nuclear weapons. Bevan's "switch" on the H-bomb earned him sharp left-wing criticism at the September-October conference of the party at Brighton.

Bevan would not remove American bases from Britain but suggests that since those bases are there, London should have more influence than it now has on Anglo-American policy. He asks for an agreed Middle

East program and a wider exchange of nuclear information.

Mr. Bevan adheres to his conviction that Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations, but he would "let the sleeping dog of Formosa lie." He would boldly admit the Soviet Union into partnership in the Middle East, hoping that Moscow would then accept a joint guarantee of Israel's frontiers and a general arms embargo throughout the area. He advocates a German settlement which would see Germany united but wholly neutralized and largely disarmed.

On domestic policy, Labor has sought gingerly to come to terms with capitalism by abandoning its identification with "nationalization" in favor of a new plan whereby government would buy shares in key industries and government officials would sit on boards of directors. (Left-wing Laborites call this a meaningless straddle.) Labor would also renationalize the steel industry and long-haul road transport while repealing the recent Tory-passed Rent Act, which removed rent control from 5 million houses and apartments.

Further by-elections will be necessary to gauge the voter-appeal of Labor's "new look" and its "new Bevan." Meanwhile, the Conservatives have a breathing spell—in the midst of Sputniks and a NATO "summit" conference—to make a success of their stiff policies against inflation: their raising of the bank rate; their decontrol of rents; their sworn de-

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NATO: Step to Interdependence?

The NATO Council meeting of heads of government which will be held in Paris December 16-18 has a unique and epochal opportunity—the opportunity of starting the non-Communist world down the road to real interdependence. President Eisenhower is to participate, not because he enjoys such gatherings, but because he knows the future of the West may hang on this meeting.

If this topflight get-together should prove a failure it can spell the eventual collapse of the free-world alliance and the end of the Western way of life—not this year or this decade, but next year or a generation from now. And it can be a failure if all that comes out of it are words, promises, exhortations, posturing. The time for such things—if there ever was a time—is definitely past.

No Time for Complacency

The Russians have shown by their remarkable scientific feats that they are playing for keeps in the race for weapons and rocket development. No longer is the Administration poo-hooing the Sputnik accomplishments of the U.S.S.R. No longer is the President denying there is a race on between East and West to develop these fantastically complicated items.

The trouble is that the challenge the free world faces is extremely grave; yet the preparation for it is inadequate, and the time is short to get organized. Rome was not built in a day; and the blueprint for true free-world interdependence cannot be ratified in three days in Paris—much less drafted in the few weeks before the meeting. Washington is quite aware that it cannot avoid act-

ing as leader of the free world, but it still has to decide where it should lead, with what, and how.

The President hopes to go to the meeting with bipartisan support—but all he can be sure of is bipartisan goodwill. Until the Administration spells out what it feels is necessary, and until the other NATO nations indicate what they think and will accept, Congress can hardly underwrite anything. It certainly is not going to give the President a blank check—no matter how much he may want one or need one. At Paris it is not the generalities that will be troublesome, but the specifics.

Three Stumbling-Blocks

One stumbling-block in this process of forging interdependence is represented by our other allies—Formosa, Korea, the Philippines, Japan, the SEATO and Rio pact nations. Washington cannot go into partnership with its NATO allies—pooling brains, stockpiling nuclear weapons, allotting defense tasks—and expect its non-NATO allies to like it. They want to get into the act too and, in fact, have been promised a place in the act by the United States-British Declaration of October 25 following President Eisenhower's talks with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan.

An even more difficult stumbling-block may well turn out to be the other NATO nations, which will be asked to trust the United States for their security to a far greater extent than in the past. For under the "interdependence" theory of defense for the free world the United States would be the principal supplier of nuclear weapons, of guided missiles,

of the costlier and more complicated arms. The French, for example, would have to be persuaded not to go into nuclear weapons production and may even have to forego a navy in any new assignment of military tasks. And other nations would have to make comparable changes in their present defense plans to avoid duplication, waste, rivalry. All the NATO members will have to be let in on just what military feats the United States can accomplish with its hush-hush weapons if they are to trust their security to our use of these weapons. They are not going to be satisfied with assurances but will demand information about our weapons and their potentialities which cannot be given under our present secrecy rules.

Thus, Congress could be another stumbling-block. For it is Congress which must amend the Atomic Energy Act, or McMahon Act, to permit the pooling of talents and sharing of secrets which is now regarded as the essence of interdependence. And while the President is going to see a bipartisan group of Congressmen on December 3 before he takes off for Paris, that is a far cry from having congressional approval of whatever arrangements he may make at the NATO meeting.

All that can reasonably be expected in Paris is that the groundwork will be laid for the new era of interdependence—but the groundwork must be laid with more than words. That is the challenge, the opportunity and the awesome responsibility of President Eisenhower and his associates at this fateful moment in human history.

NEAL STANFORD



Can We Deal With Russia?

Once again, as happened at the end of World War II and after the death of Stalin, the United States is faced with the critical decision of whether or not it can—and if so should—deal with Russia. The decision was squarely put up to Washington by Communist party leader Nikita S. Khrushchev on November 6, the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

In what was clearly intended to be a history-making address, Mr. Khrushchev, fresh from his Sputnik triumphs and his downgrading of the World War II hero, Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, denied that the earth satellite is a threat to peace. "We proceed," he said, "from the thought that for the victory of socialism wars are not needed." He called for a top-level conference of capitalist and Communist countries to reach an agreement on the basis of "reality and mutual understanding" which could prevent war, end the cold war, and establish peaceful East-West relations.

Moscow's Peace Bid

"If," he said, "all states, and, in the first place, the Soviet Union and the United States as states possessing the most powerful economic and military resources, initiate collaboration in a business-like manner and, by mutual understanding, reach a solution of important international problems, including the disarmament problem, the chances of averting another war and of establishing a lasting and stable peace for all countries and people would increase considerably."

He had no intention, Khrushchev declared, of asserting that there are

no contradictions between socialism and capitalism. "The ideological differences are irreconcilable. They will continue to exist. This, however, does not exclude peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition between socialist and capitalist countries. With the present development of military technology any attempts by the imperialists to unleash a world war would lead to inconceivable destruction and losses."

Two Sides to Question

In weighing Moscow's peace bid, American leaders are confronted with two diametrically opposed arguments. Some experts on Russian affairs believe that a top-level conference with Khrushchev would prove fruitless. The Russian Communists, they say, cannot be trusted to deal honestly with the West or to carry out such obligations as they assume in the course of negotiations. In any confrontation of East and West, the West, in their opinion, would be at a disadvantage because no Western country can have the control over its military, economic and political resources exercised by a totalitarian regime.

Opponents of new negotiations with Moscow believe that the Soviet leaders, faced with stresses and strains within the U.S.S.R. as well as in their relations with Communist China and their Eastern European neighbors, are by no means as strong as their scientific and technological successes would lead one to assume. What they want, according to this argument, is to use the threat of new weapons to force acceptance by the United States of a plan for division of the world between the two great

powers, which Stalin had sought without success at the end of World War II. Spokesmen for this school of thought would prefer to have the United States wait to see how events develop within the Soviet orbit, and meanwhile strengthen its ties with NATO and other non-Communist military alliances. Roscoe Drummond has warned of the dangers of another Munich as a result of the end of the cold war. The columnist David Lawrence has said that the removal of Khrushchev is "absolutely essential to the peace of all peoples."

Other experts take a different view. They argue that time is working in favor of Russia, not of the United States. The Soviet leaders, they say, may prove to be as accurate in their prediction that they will catch up with the over-all industrial output of the West as in their predictions about their scientific achievements. They believe that the United States may not again in the foreseeable future be able to forge ahead of Russia and that therefore this is the propitious moment for new negotiations. In their opinion the Russians are no more in a position than we are to dominate their allies. Any negotiations from now on would in any case have to take place not in a bipolar world, with the U.S.S.R. and the United States as the sole protagonists, but in the larger community of nations, where it would be impossible to carry out an old-fashioned division of the globe into two spheres of influence.

With this in mind they welcome, rather than oppose, Russia's proposal to terminate the disarmament nego-

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Will Thailand Shift Its Course?

by John Brown Mason

John Brown Mason, former United States cultural attaché in Thailand, is professor of government at Georgetown University. At present he is the visiting Chester W. Nimitz Professor of Social and Political Philosophy at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

A BLOODLESS military coup during the midnight hours of September 17 toppled the pro-Western government of Field Marshal Pibul Songgram, premier of Thailand and pilot of his country's government for the better part of the past 25 years.

As troops and tanks under the command of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, commander in chief of the army, took up strategic posts in Bangkok without meeting resistance, Premier Pibul fled to safety in the neighboring state of Cambodia. Sarit's easy success also resulted in the loss of position and power by the third man in Thailand's military junta triumvirate, General Phao Sriyanond, former head of the national police and minister of the interior. Unlike Pibul, who had refused to resign upon the curt demand of Marshal Sarit and 58 army officers who were at the same time members of Parliament, General Phao surrendered and accepted the offer of exile in Switzerland in preference to the alternative opportunity of leading the meditative life of a Buddhist monk in his home country.

While some Western diplomats stationed in Bangkok reportedly were surprised by the overthrow of Pibul—long famed as a politician with nine lives—the possibility and, in fact, the probability of military coups is inherent in the Thai system of government. Pibul himself took a leading part in the historical *coup d'état* of 1932 which ended the absolute monarchy in one of Asia's few independent states of that time.

The intellectuals who led the coup

considered the absolute monarchy an anachronism as well as an obstacle to progress, especially as King Prajadhipok fell more and more under the influence of reactionary relatives who were unable to read the signs of the times.

The coup leaders differed greatly in political outlook, but they shared the will to power and political leadership. They forced a ready-made constitution upon the king—a constitution which has since been repeatedly abolished, amended and re instituted—and introduced other forms of Western political democracy, but remained essentially an oligarchy. Shifts of power took place within the group, which brought in new members from time to time and eliminated others.

Interlocking Directorates

Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, with the premier elected—as a matter of form—by the National Assembly, half of which is elected and the rest appointed by the cabinet. In actual practice the premier usually holds office because he is the leader of the group in power, since 1947 popularly known as the “coup” group, which has been in control since that time. Marshal Sarit, the current strong man, however, has refused the post of premier and prefers to control the government more indirectly.

For ten years most of the two dozen cabinet members have been ranking armed forces and police officers. Since Police General Phao lost out in the recent shuffle to his old

rival, Army Field Marshal Sarit, the high police officers will have to be satisfied with posts of lesser eminence. Customarily, some ministers hold several cabinet posts and sometimes important outside posts as well, for instance, the presidencies of the country's only two liberal arts universities. In this way the cabinet runs the country through a system of interlocking directorates, as it were, exercising direct control over the armed forces, economy and education. The government is highly centralized, and local self-government is more impressive on paper than in practice.

Since 1932 some governments have held more democratic views than others, but none have been truly representative. Figuratively, at least, the constitution is published in a loose-leaf edition. The establishment of political parties was allowed in the liberal post-World War II atmosphere, but they were later suppressed. When Pibul returned from his trip to the United States in 1956, he promised the legalization of political parties and the holding of free and honest elections in February 1957.

Rise of Opposition

Apparently he opened the floodgates of public opinion wider than he realized. His government won a narrow victory, but only at the price of fraudulent ballot counts in the hotly contested Bangkok districts, where Pibul himself and several other cabinet members squeezed in by might rather than right. The campaign had witnessed the oratory

of some 900 candidates for 160 seats, with the six major parties of varying importance ranging from the Seri Manangasila (or government) party and two of its progovernment satellites to the three chief opposition parties — Nai Khuang's Democratic party (right-wing liberal); the Free Democratic party, a loose organization mostly confined to the northeast provinces; and the left-wing Socialist Front.

Most opposition was concentrated in the northeast, the south and Bangkok. The northeast is economically backward and has long felt neglected by the central government. The southern provinces have a large Malay Muslim majority, with a strong separatist tradition and various cultural, religious and economic grievances. In Bangkok the opposition's main asset seems to have been the great popularity of Nai Khuang, the leader of the Democratic party, who has a reputation for having remained incorruptible, although he has been premier four times. He is pro-West and pro-SEATO, but wants the government to act more discreetly on the side of the West. The public reaction to the election frauds was a near-unanimity of angry protest, and the government considered it wise not to disperse by force of arms a demonstration of thousands of students joined by many others in front of Government House. Instead, the demonstrators were allowed to present their demands for Pibul's resignation.

Internal Change Not Expected

In general the elections revealed the unpopularity of the regime, which was known for its corruption and neglect of several areas of the country. There was also a certain amount of neutralism and anti-Americanism among both government supporters and opposition ele-

ments. However, as long as the Thai economy and internal conditions remain stable—and there is no present indication of a change—the present coup group, or a reasonable facsimile thereof, appears likely to remain in power. They are hard-willed men who know what they want in terms of political power and personal profits, and they are in control of a large army with the necessary (American-furnished) hardware in the form of tanks, planes and the like.

Shifts in personality may occur again as the result of personal rivalries, intrigues or concessions to public opinion. But the possibilities of their being replaced by an entirely new set of leaders as the result of the elections scheduled for the late autumn are slim. The spread of political consciousness and democratic convictions is handicapped by the small size of the Thai middle class (trade and commerce are in the hands of the Chinese), the lack of experience in self-government, and the absence of real dissatisfaction with government policies or general conditions (except for the issue of official corruption) anywhere except in the distressed but sparsely populated areas of the northeast provinces and in the Malay-inhabited southern peninsula. And any new trend that the elections might, by chance, reveal can easily be counterbalanced by the one-half of the National Assembly which is appointed by the cabinet.

The overthrow of the Pibul regime does not appear likely to cause a basic change in Thailand's pro-Western and pro-SEATO foreign policy. Marshal Sarit pledged its continuation in a meeting with American Ambassador Max W. Bishop and at a press conference, and effectively underlined his statements by his choice of the new head of government, Premier Nai Pote Sarasin.

The new premier was ambassador to Washington until recently, when he was elected secretary-general of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, composed of the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Sarit's policy statement was further strengthened by the announcement that Prince Wan Waithayakon, foreign minister and recent president of the United Nations General Assembly, will continue as Thailand's representative in that body.

Modified Foreign Policy?

At the same time, a close look at Thailand's international position reveals several factors which may cause its foreign policy henceforth to follow a less one-sided Western orientation.

Thailand's geography and topography do not represent an asset on a continent threatened by Red Chinese expansion. While the country has no common border with China or North Vietnam, its neighbors—Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Malaya—and nearby South Vietnam are either ruled by neutralist regimes or have their hands full in warding off Communist pressures from inside and outside.

In addition, some 500,000 Malays in southern Thailand constitute an unreliable factor. Their potential threat is somewhat paralleled by the presence in the exposed northeast provinces of about 50,000 North Vietnamese refugees, with pro-Communist tendencies, whom Thailand has been unable to keep out or return home. In Bangkok itself one-third of the population are Chinese, who in the country as a whole number some 3 million out of a total population of 20 million. The Chinese are a potential danger to national security. Although Bangkok is a long way from the northern frontier, it can be

easily attacked by air. The overcentralization of industry, commerce and government in this city of over a million inhabitants offers a tempting target for enemy bombers, which could paralyze the nerve center of any resistance the government might put up.

While Thailand is not threatened by a domestic Communist movement—except, perhaps, among the Chinese elements—it faces the possible subjection of some nearby countries to Red control by means of internal subversion. Laos and perhaps Cambodia are in this category. In such an event Thailand would find itself with Peiping-dominated next-door neighbors all along its eastern border—roughly half of its international frontier on land. While Laos and Cambodia, as such, would pose no direct military threat to Thailand, the possibility of Communist infiltration would increase greatly, especially as the Laotians are a branch of the Thai family speaking a Thai dialect. At such time the long-standing economic and educational backwardness of the northeast provinces might prove fertile ground for radicalism.

In spite of these circumstances, Bangkok's foreign policy has hitherto been firmly linked to that of the West in general and of the United States in particular. Thailand has risked Peiping's wrath by its votes in the United Nations on Korea, admission of Red China to the UN, and other questions. In turn, Thailand has gained by extensive American assistance in the training and equipment of its armed forces along modern lines and sizable shipments of arms. And a considerable amount of United States economic and technical aid has strengthened Thailand's industrial and agricultural development, its port and transportation facilities, and its systems of edu-

cation and public health. Also, its international position is greatly enhanced by its membership in SEATO, which has its headquarters in Bangkok.

Possible New Trends

Thailand's protection as a member of SEATO, however, is weakened by two factors: All its allies are separated from it by land masses—for example, Pakistan on the western side of Burma and India—or by vast ocean expanses. As British, French and American naval and air forces are declining in size or are kept busy in other corners of the globe, their prompt and effective availability remains a matter of some doubt in the minds of the Thai. Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan would hardly be able to offer Thailand the military assistance needed in case of aggression. Many Thai think that SEATO and the Manila Charter are more important as a mutual agreement on principles of defense than as an actual commitment, for instance by the United States, to come to the immediate and effective aid of Thailand in case of aggression.

In the past year or so, articulate public sentiment in Thailand has made an increasing number of attacks on the government's foreign policy, either because it was definitely and closely linked with Washington or because the Bangkok government was so open and frank about it. Expressed sentiments ranged from openly voiced anti-American feelings—these apparently are not too widely shared—to the warning that foreign policy, while basically pro-West, should refrain "from catching the eye of the tiger." It has been argued that SEATO might well be played down, the United States criticized, Chinese culture praised, and trade with Peiping welcomed. Some critics have added that recognition of Pei-

ping need not be pressed but should be kept in mind for the time when it would be admitted to the UN and might well be recognized by the United States. Meanwhile, it is asked, why not have Chinese drama groups visit Bangkok and Thai dancers perform in Peiping?

Some policies of cultural and economic *rapprochement* with the Chinese mainland were actually initiated by the Pibul regime in a rather left-handed manner. It appears likely that they will be intensified by the Sarit regime, although at first perhaps slowly.

Thailand may be a long way from achieving genuine political democracy. But under the impact of international and domestic events it has taken great strides since 1932 along the lines of Western political ideals—and in opposition to the teachings of communism. This is shown by increasing opportunities for education, advancement of women's rights, a widening circle of intellectuals and growing insistence on freedom of speech and press and freedom of political choice.

This basic domestic trend should also help to keep its foreign policy on the side of the West. Thailand, however, may refuse to confine itself to the narrow pro-American path it has followed in the past, and may attempt to "balance" its foreign relations in a bipolar world by expanding its contacts with Communist China. This would put Thailand in a middle position between the "uncommitted" status of India and the exposed position of the United States.

READING SUGGESTIONS: W. MacMahon Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia*, 2d ed. (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1956), Chap. 7, "Thailand"; Richard J. Coughlin, "The Status of the Chinese Minority in Thailand," *Pacific Affairs* (December 1952); "In China's Shadow: Stable Siam Looks West," *The Economist* (London, December 15, 1956); Albert Pickerell and Daniel E. Moore, "Elections in Thailand," *Far Eastern Survey* (June and July 1957).

Spotlight

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tiations, which have hitherto been conducted by the four great powers and Canada and which had reached a dead end last summer in London, and to transfer them to a larger forum, although not necessarily the 82-nation forum of the United Nations. They do not expect miracles of reconciliation between the United States and the U.S.S.R.—but neither do they think that Washington can base its foreign policy on the hope of “unconditional surrender” by the Russians. A NATO strengthened by political and economic cooperation, they say, would improve the bargaining position of the United States, but sooner or later decisions of broader scope will have to be taken—with respect to the future of Germany, the Middle East, Communist China. And at least on two of these issues the negotiations as of now cannot be conducted in the UN, of which West Germany and Communist China are not members.

Shall We Go Halfway?

Cyrus S. Eaton, president of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, in an article published by the New York *Herald Tribune* on November 8 says the United States should meet Russia halfway. “I don’t suppose you’d find any one in the world more dedi-

cated to capitalism and democracy than I am. But I think the best way to destroy these two institutions in America is to go to war with Russia. The longer we put off finding a common ground, the tougher it’s going to be to find. Russia has tremendous resources, and her people have a great willingness to work and a strong love of country. . . . We’re faced with a condition, whether we like it or not, in which Russia has all the instruments of modern war, and it just doesn’t make sense to continue that kind of an armaments contest. This is the time for anyone who feels this way to speak up.”

Those who oppose new negotiations with Russia dismiss all of Khrushchev’s statements as “propaganda.” Their critics remind them that the same phrase had once been used to describe Moscow’s predictions of earth satellites. Those who favor new negotiations point out that if the United States rejects Moscow’s peace bid, which they believe will have great appeal for the Afro-Asian countries and even for Western Europe, the United States will find itself increasingly isolated—and this would obviously strengthen the position of the U.S.S.R.

Whichever point of view one takes in this debate, there is little doubt that the United States cannot long postpone a decision of dealing with

Russia. President Eisenhower, in his address of November 8 to the nation, said: “What the world needs today even more than a giant leap into outer space is a giant step towards peace.”

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first in a series of eight articles on “Great Decisions . . . 1958”—What Should U.S. Do in a Changing World?”—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

Stringer

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termination to prevent both wage increases and profit boosts until inflationary tendencies are squeezed out of the economy, production is more solidly geared for export, and the pound is secure.

Labor can upset the ambitious Conservative program by pressing an array of wage demands in various industries. There are indications, however, that Messrs. Gaitskell, Bevan & Co. are aware that public opinion could be alienated by a rash of strikes at this precarious moment. In effect, both parties are currently engaged in a prolonged battle for the allegiance of Britain’s potent floating vote, and as of now the verdict of the next general election is by no means certain.

Mr. Stringer, chief of the Washington News Bureau of *The Christian Science Monitor* and author of the front-page column, “The State of the Nations,” interviewed Mr. Aneurin Bevan during his visit to the U.S.

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